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AbstrACt
perhaps the clearest indicator of one’s partiality towards a laclauian 
approach to populism is the belief that it is a constitutive dimension 
of politics without which the latter ceases to exist. the presence of 
a frontier between the ‘people’ and its ‘other’ is the precondition 
of politics. But what if this frontier itself becomes the sole point 
around which those identities are articulated? is it still possible to 
speak of politics when there is ‘too much’ populism? the article an-
swers this question through an analysis of the extreme polarization 
in today’s turkey over the hegemonic figure of the president recep 
tayyip Erdoğan. praises for Erdoğan government as a democrat-
ic model for the muslim world withered away once the regime had 
decisively turned towards authoritarianism and begun consolidat-
ing Erdoğan’s personal control over state and society. a personali-
ty cult, named Erdoğanism here, has gradually materialised around 
his figure, overtaking all previous forms of political identity among 
his supporters and becoming one with ‘the people’. those who dis-
play even a minimal reluctance to submit themselves completely to 
his will are excommunicated as ‘enemies’ of the people. most in-
terestingly, such an extremely polarizing discourse appears to have 
turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it has been reciprocated by 
virtually all opposition actors in the form of anti-Erdoğanism. the 
very survival of opposition in Turkey seems to have been locked 
into an anti-Erdoğanist corner, risking to run the whole political 




it is the tragic tale of a turkish couple that prompted the writing of 
this article. the dinçs had been married for almost three years when 
in early 2016 the husband took his wife to criminal court for alleg-
edly insulting the turkish president recep tayyip Erdoğan. mr. 
dinç claimed his wife would ‘swear and curse whenever Erdoğan 
appeared on television’ and was unyielding in the face of his warn-
ings that ‘our president is a good man and has done well for our 
country.’ on one such night, mr. dinç explains, he warned that he 
would record her statements and when his wife dared him to go 
ahead, he finally did it and used the recording as evidence at court. 
he told reporters: ‘i am sad to end my marriage but i would do the 
same even if it were my father who was offending Erdoğan’ (trem-
blay 2016).
This incident may look mundane to seasoned observers of Turk-
ish politics. after all it is just one of about two thousand cases 
opened against individuals who are accused of insulting Erdoğan in 
the past two years, including high-school students, housewives, ac-
ademics and journalists (O’Grady 2016). The tale of Dinç couple, 
nevertheless, is of special interest because it uniquely encapsulates 
just how deeply polarizing a figure Erdoğan has become in turkey 
today, penetrating all the way down to the nuclear family and shat-
tering even the most intimate relationships. It seems to suggest that 
there is no bond strong enough to overcome the love or hatred one 
feels towards him. dinç couple could not help but kept quarrelling 
for years over their irreconcilable feelings for the President, be-
cause the way they felt about him overshadowed all other aspects 
of their relationship and determined who they were to one another: 
an Erdoğanist and an anti-Erdoğanist.
A recent survey by the German Marshall Fund titled ‘Dimen-
sions of polarization in turkey’ demonstrates that far from being an 
odd couple, the Dinçs in fact constitute the norm. In the course of 
14 years of uninterrupted single-party rule of Erdoğan’s Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), politics has turned into an ‘apocalyp-
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tic existential struggle’: 83 percent of the people do not want their 
daughter to marry someone voting for the “other” party; 79 percent 
reject the idea of doing business with them; 76 percent would not 
have each other as neighbours; and 74 percent would not even al-
low their children playing with those of others (nasi 2016).
families, friends, colleagues and all appear to be powerless in 
the face of political polarisation. how is this even possible? this 
article aims to answer this with a single term: pure populism (la-
clau 2005, 45–46). relying on the body of work of Ernesto laclau, 
it first lays out a clear definition of populism as a political logic of 
articulation, in which a logic of equivalence prevails that of differ-
ence and society is depicted as divided between two antagonistic 
camps: the ‘people’ and its ‘other’ (Laclau 1990, 2005, 2007; La-
clau & mouffe 2001). this is a definition shared by many unor-
thodox scholars of populism who have the conviction that main-
stream approaches, through their tendency to vilify it as an existen-
tial threat against democracy, inadvertently justify the increasingly 
undemocratic functioning of contemporary political regimes. They 
welcome laclau’s favourable take on populism as a breath of fresh 
air in an otherwise ‘anti-populist’ zeitgeist, a ‘post-democratic’ sta-
tus quo where the common goal seems to be ruling without the peo-
ple (Stavrakakis 2014; Crouch 2004).
But even these ‘sympathetic’ figures voice criticism over la-
clau’s assertion that populism, insofar as it postulates a ‘radical al-
ternative’ to the status quo through the construction of the exclud-
ed ‘people’, is synonymous with politics per se (laclau 2005, 47; 
2007, 225). Benjamin arditi, for instance, draws attention to non-
radical instances of populism where the exclusionary logic is re-
produced rather than contested and to the ‘dark possibilities’ that 
come along with it, such as a cult of personality and criminaliza-
tion of opposition (2007, 58, 82). He even hints at a dangerous un-
dercurrent in Laclauian theory that leaves the door open for an in-
dispensable presence of the leader as the culmination of the ‘‘peo-
ple’ (Arditi 2010). Similarly, Nadia Urbinati points out that the sine 
qua non of populism, unification of many under the single banner 
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of the ‘people’ and against an ‘other’, tends to go towards ‘cae-
sarism’ and ‘polarization’ (2013, 147). like arditi, she remains un-
convinced by laclau’s attempts at downplaying the personaliza-
tion as a convenient but not indispensable tool populism occasion-
ally employs in order to make constitutive antagonisms more pro-
nounced (ibid. 148–9).
this article concurs with these sympathetic critics. polarization 
and identification of the movement under a leader is an ever-present 
prospect of populism. But the Laclauian theory’s shortcoming is 
not that it disregards this. In fact it has a name for it: pure populism. 
Its failure is to dismiss pure populism as an impossibility, a ‘reduc-
tio ad absurdum’ point where politics could never reach in reali-
ty (Laclau 2005, 45; 2007, 82; Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 129–130). 
Examining the Erdoğanism phenomenon through the lenses of la-
clauian ontology, this article makes a dual contribution. On a theo-
retical level, it demonstrates that a point of pure populism is actual-
ly realizable. at which point politics ceases to exist and gives way 
to a sort of ‘bipolar hegemony’, a zero-sum game between two ho-
mogenous camps that are separated by a single frontier and sustain 
themselves solely through their opposition to one another (Palonen 
2009, 331). on an empirical level, it shows that Erdoğan uniquely 
constitutes that frontier in Turkey today. Instead of merely describ-
ing the polarization and personalization in contemporary turkish 
politics, it focuses on the ideological context and reveals the logic 
behind the ways in which they are produced and reproduced.
Laclauian framework
one comes across with the post-foundationalist core of laclauian 
framework frequently in the form of a single, provocative state-
ment: ‘society does not exist’ (Laclau 1990, 89–92; Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001, 111; Marchart 2007, 134–138). In his critique of 
Marxist structuralism, Laclau stresses that envisioning society as a 
‘founding totality’ formed by a base and a superstructure assigns it 
57 Gürhanlı
an ‘essential’ status with a positivity of its own (laclau 1990, 90). 
its modus operandi is presumed as waiting to be discovered be-
hind the superficial empirical variations of everyday life so that the 
knowledge of all social processes could be grounded on a consist-
ent totality. His objection to this presumption of society-as-totali-
ty is based on a linguistically informed thesis for the ‘infinitude of 
the social,’ which is the idea that ‘any system of meaning is contin-
gent, contextual, and relational’ (howarth 2004, 266). for laclau, 
the social is a contingent system of meanings that draws, and can-
not avoid drawing, a ‘horizon within which some objects are repre-
sentable while others are excluded’ (laclau 2007, 117). meanings 
assigned to objects and relations between them are fixated at the ex-
pense of infinite others that are left out. hence society as an intelli-
gible and unified whole providing exhaustive patterns of relational-
ity between all social meanings does not and cannot exist.
Laclau considers this impossibility of society as the condition of 
possibility for the political, because the residual excess of meaning 
that is bound to remain out of the frontiers of any one social also 
paves the way for an ‘infinite play of differences’ which he calls the 
discursive (laclau 1990, 172; Glynos & howarth 2007, 113–117). 
it serves as the terrain on which the political, understood as the in-
stitution and contestation of the social regimes and practices, func-
tions. the political, in the first place, is an attempt to draw fron-
tiers, to create, however temporarily, a finite order, a hegemonic 
discourse within an infinitude, striving to ‘proceed to a relative fix-
ation of the social’ (Laclau 1990, 90–1). Reaching such a relative 
fixation is not only possible but necessary, for we need a stable sys-
tem of meaning so that we can avoid getting lost in a ‘psychotic’ 
universe where there is no fixed meaning at all (laclau 2007, 70–
71; Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 112–113).
The process of reaching a temporarily stable system of mean-
ings corresponds to what laclau, following husserl, calls the sed-
imentation, which consists in forgetting the contingent origins of 
the social and mistaking them as mere objective presences (Laclau 
1990, 34–35). that is to say, naturalizing the social sphere by equal-
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izing what it is with what it has always been. nonetheless, the po-
litical is also a contestation of the social that attempts at triggering 
‘a reactivation of the contingent moment of foundation,’ unearthing 
that things have not always been the way they currently are, and 
‘thus disclosing the potential for different constructions’ (Glynos & 
howarth 2007, 116).
Political logics and populism
If the political is all about the institution and contestation of the so-
cial regimes and practices through contingent acts and decisions, 
political logics are the analytical tools offered within the laclauian 
framework to unveil the underlying grammar of those acts and de-
cisions in two opposing yet interconnected categories. while the 
logic of equivalence involves formation and reinforcement of new 
frontiers that simplify the political space by splitting it into two op-
posing camps, the logic of difference is concerned with acts and 
decisions that are aimed to impede or shatter this process of draw-
ing frontiers by expanding and complexifying it (Laclau & Mouffe 
2001, 129–130; Glynos & howarth 2007, 141–145; howarth et al. 
2000: 11–12).
to clarify these logics, Glynos and howarth invoke the exam-
ple of a struggle between national liberation forces and an occu-
pying colonial power. while the nationalists would characteristi-
cally try to ‘cancel out the particular differences of class, ethnic-
ity, region, or religion in the name of a more universal national-
ism that can serve as a common reference point,’ colonialists would 
‘attempt to break down these chains of equivalence’ through ‘the 
age-old practice of divide and rule,’ aimed at separating ‘nationalist 
groups into particular communities’ (2007, 144–145). Although the 
political space depicted by an equivalential logic is a crudely sim-
plistic one in which the meanings are condensed around two an-
tagonistic poles, it serves the goal of national liberation perfectly. 
The logic of difference, conversely, provides such a complex pic-
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ture that it weakens the sharp antagonistic polarity between the oc-
cupied and the occupier. Leaving no space for a collective mobili-
zation between different communities, it is best suited for the pur-
poses of colonialists.
It is possible to consider these logics in a continuous struggle 
for domination over the terms of political vocabulary, exerting their 
articulatory influences over the ways in which politics at any given 
moment is arranged – a struggle that accounts for the ultimate con-
tingency of these arrangements (Arditi 2010, 45; Laclau & Mouffe 
2001, 105–110). this is in harmony with the way in which laclau 
conceptualizes actual politics as ‘operating at the diverse points of 
a continuum’ between two theoretical extremes: ‘pure institution-
alism’ and ‘pure populism’ (Laclau 2005, 45). He argues that, as 
reductio ad absurdum points of logical impossibilities, these dis-
courses constitute the unreachable poles of politics, whose concur-
rent presence and tension are nonetheless prerequisites of the very 
existence of politics and its perpetual movement on that continuum 
(ibid., 46). their ‘[t]ension and reflection can be contingently com-
bined in unstable equilibria, but neither is entirely able to eliminate 
the other’ (Laclau 2007, 120).
Figure 1: Laclauian Continuum of Politics. P 59
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at one impossible end there is pure institutionalism, which is ex-
clusively dominated by a logic of difference that emphasizes only 
the disparities between particularities and therefore eliminates any 
ground for their partial identification with each other (laclau 2007, 
62–63; 2005, 45). Laclau argues time and again that a social deter-
mined solely by the institutionalist discourse would entail ‘the dis-
missal of politics tout court’ and reduce it to the level of administra-
tion (2007, x). it would liken those in the myths of a totally recon-
ciled ‘society’, such as Platonic republic or Disraeli’s ‘one nation’, 
where the particular elements constituting a “society” are absorbed 
into the system in a completely individual manner and transformed 
into objective differences with absolutely nothing in common but 
their existence under one community (Laclau 1990, 69–70; Laclau 
& Mouffe 2001, 130). As the positive nature of all its terms is estab-
lished within an infinitely static structure, there would be absolute-
ly no ground for ‘dislocation’, hence for politics (Laclau 1990, 71–
72; 2007, 78). in actual cases, however, the political arrangements 
where the logic of difference prevails [left half of the continuum in 
the figure above] liken more the consensual regimes of contempo-
rary western European countries where popular interests and de-
mands tend to be dealt with in a technocratic manner, leaving little 
space for the formulation of collective political identities (Crouch 
2004, 6; Stavrakakis 2014, 506).
At the opposite end of Laclauian political continuum resides an 
equally impossible discourse of pure populism. It is a discourse 
dominated solely by a logic of equivalence, requiring complete col-
lapse of all social differences into a singular identity and conse-
quently leaving no space for their differential particularities (Laclau 
2005, 45). laclau invokes the freudian notion of a group whose 
only libidinal tie is love for the narcissistic leader as an example of 
this impossibly pure presence of logic of equivalence (2007, 52–
60, 82). Placing the leader into the place of their ego ideal, group 
members reach a point of complete identification with one anoth-
er that results in a total consumption of their particular egos under 
‘the name of the leader’ (2005, 40). in laclau’s own words: ‘the 
61 Gürhanlı
equivalential logic leads to singularity, and singularity to the iden-
tification of the unity of the group with the name of the leader’ 
(2007: 100). On a macro-political level, this means that pure pop-
ulism conceives the social as a homogeneous whole whose coher-
ence would be exclusively assured by the presence of a frontier sep-
arating the ‘people’ from its ‘other’, like in the discourse of mes-
sianic movements where a total submission to the messiah consti-
tutes the identity of the movement and incredulous others its oppo-
site (laclau & mouffe 2001, 130). the world here is so infinitely 
separated between a righteous movement and its negative reverse 
evil-incarnated that there exists no difference within those camps. 
Each and every element constituting them becomes identical with 
one another, bearing no particularity of their own.
Contrary to general assumption, Laclauian conception of pop-
ulism emerges as a rather straightforward one once these ontolog-
ical premises are laid out; it is a certain kind of political logic of 
articulation in which the logic of equivalence prevails over that 
of difference, i.e. right half of the continuum in the figure above. 
Like any political logic, populism institutes the social by impos-
ing a finite and intelligible whole of meaning: a totality (Glynos & 
howarth 2007, 141–145). nevertheless, what makes a discourse 
distinctively populist is that the totality it institutes is predominant-
ly articulated around an antagonistic division. It is concerned pri-
marily with the construction of a political identity around the ‘peo-
ple’ by welding an equivalential chain between various differen-
tial elements whose shared ‘lack’ is conceived as resulting direct-
ly from the existence of an ‘other’; a ‘constitutive outside’ that is 
at once the nemesis of the ‘people’ and necessary condition of pos-
sibility of its existence (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 127–134; Laclau 
1990, 17–26; Mouffe 1993, 2). The ‘people’ of populism is, there-
fore, a partial component that aspires to be conceived as the only le-
gitimate totality by instituting a frontier of exclusion, ‘a part which 
identifies itself with the whole’ (laclau 2007, 82; canovan 2000, 
78–79).
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within this bidimensional depiction, it is possible to see the rea-
son behind laclau’s controversial claim that equalizes populism 
with politics. the ineradicable presence of populism in politics 
stems from the impossibility of ever reaching the point where the 
logic of equivalence is entirely absent, i.e. pure institutionalism. 
there is always an excess of meaning that destabilizes its ‘coinci-
dence with the limits of community.’ this is why, he insists, ‘there 
is no political intervention which is not populistic to some extent’ 
and, thus, the question is not if, but ‘to what degree’ populism is 
present in a given discourse (Laclau 2005, 45; 2007, 81, 154).
Erdoğanist devotion
But how about the other end where politics becomes too populist 
and ceases to exist? Is pure populism really an unreachable limit 
case as laclau theorizes? this section makes use of the laclauian 
framework and tools to illustrate that the polarization in contempo-
rary turkish politics has reached to such an extreme that it fulfils 
the conditions enlisted for a limit case of pure populism. Differen-
tial particularities in contemporary Turkish politics are all practical-
ly eliminated under two antagonistically constructed identities and 
the line dividing them: Erdoğanists and anti-Erdoğanists.
from the time of its foundation in 2001, Erdoğan’s akp has 
won every single election with an ever increasing landslide, con-
solidating its support base to roughly 50 % of the electorate in the 
last few years. But especially since his ascension to the presiden-
cy in august 2014, Erdoğan is not leading a party but a movement, 
what is called dava [the cause] (alaranta 2015, 98). Erdoğanists in 
Turkey pledge their oath of allegiance to the leader not the party, 
whom they regard as the ‘steel core of the cause’ (Eseyan 2016) and 
the ‘voice and breath of the people’ (Fraser 2016). The party, for all 
intents and purposes, functions as an institutional tool for Erdoğan 
to keep appearances in a formally parliamentarian regime where 
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the executive power lays in the hands of pm and the presidency re-
mains largely a ceremonial position.
Arguably this has been the case for long but become most appar-
ent once Erdoğan left his post as the akp leader for the presiden-
cy while maintaining his monopoly over the party. in a move that 
has de facto suspended the constitution, he keeps picking and ap-
pointing the party leader, council members and government minis-
ters, as well as leading the cabinet himself. most recently, Erdoğan 
even forced pm ahmet davutoğlu to resign from his post for fail-
ing to keep a ‘low profile’ and, instead, acting as if he really held 
any power (akyol 2016c). he was promptly replaced with Binali 
Yıldırım, a long-time Erdoğanist with a low enough profile to push 
through the constitutional changes that would ultimately terminate 
his own office and transform turkey into an executive presidential 
regime – or as Yıldırım himself has put it: ‘to legalize the de facto 
situation’ (Mert 2016).
But far from being limited to the akp cadres, Erdoğanists con-
stitute a significant portion of turkish society who are loud and 
proud in their devotion to the leader. AKP supporters make up ap-
proximately the half of turkey’s electorate, among whom Erdoğan’s 
approval rate is around 80 percent (Erdoğan 2016, 2). millions of 
users gather daily in various social media groups like the ‘Lovers of 
Erdoğan’ to celebrate their shared adoration for ‘the eternal owner 
of [their] hearth’ in the form of photos, songs and poems. Usually 
venerated as the ‘chief’ [reis] or the ‘master’ [usta], Erdoğan’s im-
age, along with his quotes, make up all the content on those incred-
ibly popular pages. one of their most popular mottos on twitter 
reads, ‘whatever the Chief says, that’s it!’ Another group of devot-
ed Erdoğanists often appear in rallies wearing their signature dress 
of burial clothes that symbolize their readiness to sacrifice them-
selves for him (Çağaptay 2015).
it is tempting to discuss the Erdoğanism phenomenon, specifi-
cally the astonishing devotion it has aroused in masses and the pe-
culiar relationship it has formed among them, in close contact with 
the above-mentioned freudian notion of a group in which the only 
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common tie is the love for the leader. Having elevated him into the 
place of their ego ideal, members of such a group reach a point of 
complete ‘identification’ with one another, resulting in total con-
sumption of their particular egos under that of the leader (Freud 
2001, 105-116; Laclau 2007, 52-60). what ensues is a distinctive-
ly libidinal bond formed between the group members and the lead-
er as their shared object-choice of love, in which the latter is ideal-
ized to the point of sublime and thus becomes immune to criticism 
(Žižek 2008, 192).
Statements by Erdoğanists from all ranks and creeds are indeed 
a testimony to the functioning of such a libidinal bond. interviewed 
during a presidential rally, a 65 years-old housewife declared that, 
like her co-Erdoğanists wrapped in burial clothes, she would ‘die 
gladly’ if Erdoğan asked her to, for he was ‘the joy of [her] life.’ 
her friend also stated that her ‘greatest desire in this world’ was to 
make her 2.5 years-old son meet the president, who was ‘in love 
with Erdoğan just like his mother’ (Çetin 2014). in a similar tone, 
nuran Yıldız, the local head of akp’s women’s Branch, encour-
aged women to become members of the party, which she regard-
ed ‘a spousal link to Erdoğan himself’ (keneş 2013). it is impor-
tant to note that this is in no way a phenomenon limited to the fe-
male Erdoğanists. fettah tamince, a billionaire businessman, went 
on record as early as in 2004 stating: ‘I have fallen in love the mo-
ment i met Erdoğan and since then i see him in my dreams 3–4 days 
a week’ (Süsoy 2004). Ethem Sancak, a leading media tycoon, fol-
lowed the suit more recently: ‘the more i saw him, the more i fell 
in love. as i got to know Erdoğan, i realized that such a kind of 
divine love between two men is possible. i say to Erdoğan: ‘may 
my mom, dad, wife and children be sacrificed for you’ (tremblay 
2015).
this common emphasis on self-sacrifice is of special interest 
because the use of religious, particularly Islamic practices, termi-
nology and vocabulary in reference to Erdoğan as a holy figure is 
another, even more prevalent way in which Erdoğanists express 
their veneration for the leader. for instance, a glass Erdoğan drank 
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water from while making a speech was carefully preserved by the 
head of akp’s Youth Branch in istanbul and exhibited like a sa-
cred token (Gürsel 2016). the three provinces Erdoğan was respec-
tively born in, served as a mayor and got elected mp from were la-
belled as ‘holy cities’ by the then Minister of EU Affairs, for they 
had ‘paved the way for the emergence of the greatest leader tur-
key has ever seen’ (Hakan 2013). A leader so rare and special, ac-
cording to another akp deputy, that ‘we shall pray a special prayer 
twice a day to thank allah for granting [him] to us’ (taşkın 2011). 
A leading columnist of Takvim daily took a step further and count-
ed Erdoğan as belonging to a holy species of leaders that are ‘sent 
down from heaven’ with a duty to ‘put things in order and complete 
whatever is missing’ (akarca 2013).
It is not easy to dismiss these acts and remarks as hypocritical 
displays of devotion either, because they often go beyond a rhe-
torical sanctification of the leader and become outright heresy ac-
cording to the islamic norms both Erdoğan and his disciples strict-
ly adhere to. in 2008, a religious book containing a poem with the 
lines ‘Erdoğan is the guardian of the way to allah, to upset Erdoğan 
is to upset allah’ were distributed in thousands with the consent 
of local authorities (Çetin 2008). his name was listed among mo-
hammad’s children in a so-called id paper fashioned for the Proph-
et by local akp cadres during election campaign (karadaş 2012). 
Government’s approval of building a new hospital was praised 
as ‘Erdoğan’s Sunnah’ – an islamic term used exclusively for the 
deeds of prophet himself (Gezen & küçükkuru 2013). in fact, 
Erdoğanists sometimes do not even bother beating around the bush-
es and express it directly that Erdoğan is like a ‘second prophet’ to 
them (kılınç 2010). So much so that they believe ‘even touching 
him is a form of worship’ (Üzer 2011). ultimately, this belief in him 
as the ‘messenger of allah’ (velidedeoğlu 2015), ‘leader of all be-
lievers’ (Önal 2014) and ‘caliph of the Earth’ (Bozkurt 2014) turns 
literally into deification at times, as in the case of yet another akp 
deputy who went all-in with his statement that Erdoğan could rule 
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the world because he ‘embodies all the qualities of allah in him-
self’ (Akyol 2016c).
Enemies within
considering this intense devotion to Erdoğan that often reaches to 
the level of worship, it is plausible to propose that Erdoğanists are 
not a group of ordinary political supporters but of disciples follow-
ing a sublime leader who is beyond criticism in their eyes. he is 
nothing less than the perfect embodiment of the cause, the party and 
the people for them. Any act that breaks their unity poses an exis-
tential risk to the identity of every individual member and that of 
group as a whole, since the latter functions on the premise that its 
members are one and the same in an entirely homogenous union. 
Therefore anything less than a complete submission to the lead-
er on the part of a member, regardless of their office, equals auto-
matically to treason and, in order to ensure a successful preserva-
tion of group homogeneity, is responded by excommunication. A 
recent column in the pro-Erdoğan daily Star aptly summarizes the 
way in which this principle functions and therefore deserves to be 
quoted in extenso:
[recent change of leadership in the akp] signifies a change of mental-
ity regarding how to situate oneself in relation to the leader and how to 
administer the movement accordingly, [which] entitles not just fidel-
ity but also loyalty and dependence [to the leader] - - The cause and 
the leader are one and the same thing, which can never be separated. 
one cannot have a sense of the cause without a bond of loyalty to the 
leader - -Erdoğan is not just the founding leader of a political party but 
someone who has materialized the cause in himself and thus become 
the embodiment of hope for the people and ummah - - None of us is in-
dispensable whereas Erdoğan is our indispensable leader - - it is surely 
a mistake that anyone, regardless of their office, could dare to equalize 
oneself with the leader or speak of him as if he is their equal. that is 
what we believe in and live by. (metiner 2016.)
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in a recent interview, a once-leading member of Erdoğan’s inner 
circle has explained how this principle works among Erdoğanists, 
speaking of a ‘system of intimidation and bullying’ to obtain com-
plete submission: ‘99 % allegiance would not suffice to save you 
from being turned into nothing in [Erdoğan’s] eyes…after even the 
tiniest of criticisms there comes a machine gun of slanders, black-
mails, threats and insults.’ (Bekdil 2016; Ongun 2016.) Naturally, 
the list of loyalists-turned-traitors is getting longer each day.
let us just take the examples of Bülent arınç and the ex-presi-
dent abdullah Gül. arınç was a long-time deputy pm, parliament 
speaker for the party, and one of the most prominent members of 
‘the cause’ overall. along with Gül and Erdoğan, he makes up the 
so-called ‘founding trio’ who established the akp in 2001. Yet his 
credentials could not stop the wrath of Erdoğanists once he voiced 
reservations over the president’s interference into government is-
sues and diverged from the official line sanctioned by the leader on 
issues like the Kurdish problem and freedom of expression. On pro-
Erdoğan dailies he was labelled as a ‘traitor’ who was ‘speaking in 
the language of the terrorists’ to topple the president (Akyol 2016a). 
Erdoğan refused to utter arınç’s name thereafter, calling him in-
stead the ‘dishonest one’ (küçükşahin 2016). the same goes for 
Gül as well. his plans for switching offices with Erdoğan in a pu-
tin/medvedev style move collapsed when he showed signs of dis-
approval towards Erdoğan’s policy of brutal suppression of public 
protests in the summer of 2013 and called attention to the risks of 
increasing polarization (Çandar 2015a; Gardner 2016). he too was 
called a traitor, acting ‘greedy’ like ‘Brutus’ and protecting enemies 
of the cause (Yılmaz 2015). Since then both have practically disap-
peared from the political arena.
other akp heavyweights accompanied them into political lim-
bo, never to be seen again. The party’s founding deputy and ex-
minister of education hüseyin Çelik was labelled a ‘cryptic ter-
rorist’ for criticizing his party’s polarizing politics and promptly 
demoted from the government ranks (Yılmaz 2016). ali Babacan, 
known as the akp’s ‘economy tsar’ responsible for the country’s 
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financial recovery in the 2000s, was accused of ‘high treason’ for 
defending the independence of the Central Bank and not sharing 
Erdoğan’s conspiratorial views about a global ‘interest rate lobby’ 
undermining turkey’s economy (Yackley 2015). Sadullah Ergin, 
ex-minister of justice who spearheaded the legal reforms in harmo-
ny with the Eu acquis, lost his seat after refusing to prepare laws 
that would bring judiciary under complete control of the execu-
tive and was declared a member of terrorist organisation (Çandar 
2015a; ramoğlu 2016). and finally, the most recent casualty in this 
war between Erdoğanists and their ’enemies within’ turned out to 
be ahmet davutoğlu, who stood by Erdoğan’s side since the begin-
ning, first as his chief foreign policy advisor, then foreign minister, 
and lastly PM. Even he could not avoid being excommunicated as 
a ‘traitor’ who ‘collaborated with the west’ and ‘its trojan horses 
inside’ once he diverged from the leader’s will, i.e. attempted de-
laying the transition towards executive presidency and rebuilding 
bridges with domestic opposition and the Eu (akyol 2016b).
Poverty of anti-Erdoğanism
Even a bigger source of worry for the future of turkish politics in 
general is the fact that the opposition actors inadvertently contrib-
ute to the reproduction of this exceptional bond fortified around 
the messianic image of Erdoğan. Just like his disciples, they place 
Erdoğan to the epicentre of their own discourses, albeit in the exact 
opposite way, and effectively reinforce his position as the sole fron-
tier polarizing the society into two camps that are mirror images of 
each other: Erdoğanists and anti-Erdoğanists.
Streets of turkey were shaken by mass anti-government pro-
tests for several months in summer 2013. Despite being triggered 
by a council plan to demolish a park in Istanbul for the construction 
of a shopping mall and residential complex, Gezi uprisings quick-
ly amassed millions of protestors all around the country chanting 
a single slogan: down with Erdoğan. it immediately became clear 
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that the issue was not just the trees in a park but what they symbol-
ized: Erdoğan government’s evermore authoritarian rule (Özkırımlı 
2014). having disregarded the demands and lifestyles of a signifi-
cant portion of the population, the government began to heavily im-
pose a set of religiously-informed moralistic policies on all spheres 
of society that made everyday life increasingly more suffocating 
for those who did not agree with its policies nor shared its values. 
regardless of the versatile profile of the groups that made up the 
Gezi protestors in terms of ethnicity, religion, ideology or party af-
filiation, they all had one thing in common; the same staunch oppo-
sition to Erdoğan. this was largely thanks to his strategy of crimi-
nalizing the protestors as ‘terrorists’ and staking a personal claim 
on the police brutality they faced, which succeeded in putting him 
into the heart of a rigid antagonism. in fact, Erdoğan quickly turned 
the whole picture into a battle for the survival of the ‘people’ by or-
ganizing a series of counter rallies titled ‘respect for the national 
will’ where tens of thousands of Erdoğanists chanted ‘we are the 
soldiers of Tayyip’ and asked their leader to give them the order 
to ‘crash’ the protestors (Gürsel 2013). Consolidating his constit-
uency, Erdoğan emerged victorious from all four subsequent elec-
tions.
a crude anti-Erdoğanism forms the backbone of other, more or-
ganized opposition actors as well. in a bid to mobilize their grass-
root supporters and gain further popularity, they actively promote 
it as reason d’être of their existence and end up reinforcing the 
Erdoğanists’ pure populism. in a typically anti-Erdoğanist speech 
he gave at the parliament, kemal kılıçdaroğlu, leader of turkey’s 
main opposition party (chp), aptly summarized his party’s mis-
sion: ‘Erdoğan dreams of being an executive president but he can-
not reach his goal before he crushes our bodies, spills our blood and 
annihilates us completely’ (demirtaş 2016; Elcivan 2016).
Until recently, electoral support for the Peoples’ Democrat-
ic Party (HDP), latest successor of pro-Kurdish parties in Turk-
ish history, used to fluctuate around 6 percent, which the party re-
ceived overwhelmingly from the kurdish-populated southeast for 
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advocating their ethno-cultural demands for decentralisation (Casi-
er et al. 2011). despite the leadership’s efforts to emphasize the 
party’s leftist stance with a distinct focus on egalitarian issues and 
a record number of female and minority candidates, for long the 
HDP failed to break off the ethnic label and its popularity remained 
limited to pro-Kurdish groups (Celep 2014). This changed almost 
overnight following hdp leader Selahattin demirtaş’s historical-
ly brief speech in the parliament, which unmistakably pronounced 
anti-Erdoğanism as his party’s raison d’être and enabled it to appeal 
to a completely different cluster of non-kurdish voters who saw in 
hdp the unique opportunity to stop Erdoğan: ‘i will express my 
message in just one sentence: mr. Erdoğan, you will never be able 
to be the head of the nation as long as the HDP exists and as long 
as the hdp people are on this soil. we will not make you the presi-
dent. we will not make you the president. we will not make you the 
president’ (de Bellaigue 2015). minutes after #SeniBaşkanYaptır
mayacağız [#wewillnotmakeYouthepresident] hit the worldwide 
trending topics list on twitter and in June 2015 elections hdp more 
than doubled its votes with 13 percent, becoming the third biggest 
parliamentary group.
Such an unprecedented surge in the support for HDP and its 
comparatively less radical agenda of decentralization meant a sig-
nificant loss of popularity for the kurdistan workers’ party (pkk), 
an illegal terrorist organisation fighting turkish state for an inde-
pendent kurdish state since 1980s (Yavuz & Özcan 2015). in a 
move quite uncharacteristic for the organisation, PKK leader Cemil 
Bayık attempted to compensate this loss by engaging in a bit of 
anti-Erdoğanism of his own, stating: ‘this is a war of life and death 
for both parties. if Erdoğan eliminates us, he will win and be able 
to defeat everyone on the side of democracy. we are the biggest ob-
stacle in the way of his dreams. we want to topple Erdoğan and the 
akp, otherwise turkey will never become a democratic country’ 
(Loyd 2016).
So, if there is one thing anti-Erdoğanists have in common with 
Erdoğanists, it is their understanding of politics as an existential 
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war. the fact that they are in equal degrees obsessed with Erdoğan 
only fuels their adversaries’ purely populist discourse that promotes 
a vision of the world ultimately divided between the leader-as-peo-
ple-embodied and his negative reverse evil-incarnated. In the eyes 
of his disciples, it gives credit to Erdoğan’s grandiose views about a 
global network of conspirators working together to topple him per-
sonally. His list of ‘enemies’ includes, but is not limited to, the op-
position parties, Gezi protestors, kurdish terrorists, finance specu-
lators, alevites, BBc, new York times, Jewish lobby, Germany, 
italy, armenian lobby, ultra-nationalists, and homosexuals (idiz 
2013; hdn 2015). as one of Erdoğan’s top advisors put in his dai-
ly column: ‘turkey stands on a delicate equilibrium where Erdoğan 
is the golden point of balance. those coalition of crooks…are ready 
to turn Turkey into a colony if only they could reach their dream of 
seeing Erdoğan gone. their goal is crystal clear: topple the strong 
leadership to feed off the treasures, lives and blood of Turkey. Just 
like in the old times’ (Bulut 2016).
this is particularly why any international reaction against tur-
key’s dramatic slippage down to authoritarianism in recent years, 
no matter how well-intended, morally upright or friendly-toned it 
is, fails to strike a chord within the country. insofar as they inevita-
bly pose a challenge to Erdoğan’s infallibility, critics are doomed to 
get dismissed a priori as ‘foreign enemies’ of the people and equiv-
alentially chained to the ‘enemies within’ (cornell 2014; armstrong 
2015). Far from easing the polarisation, they paradoxically deepen 
it by helping Erdoğan to consolidate his constituencies even fur-
ther and, consequently, weakening what little chance the opposition 
may have in dislocating some of them.
the poverty turkish opposition suffers within the limits of 
anti-Erdoğanism is perhaps best described by the chp leader 
kılıçdaroğlu. in a tone that reflects real despair, he stated: ‘Erdoğan 
is a true narcissist who listens to no one but himself, abides by no 
rules but his owns. we discuss among ourselves whether or not we 
should take such a person seriously and combat him but, alas, we 
have to…we have many projects but presenting them has no appeal 
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right now [when] turkey is de facto an akp state. from mayors to 
teachers, academics to doctors, all consider themselves as servants 
to its rule. we are asked to correct this picture [while] playing the 
game of pseudo-democracy, which is imposed on everyone and op-
posing it equals to treason.’ (Özgüven 2016.)
Conclusions
The politics in Turkey today seems to be rather analogous to the 
dinç marriage. it is a tale of two people who are on the brink of 
divorce but nonetheless condemned to a perpetual dialogue of the 
deaf to maintain who they are. it is stuck in a vicious circle, or what 
Emilia palonen calls a ‘bipolar hegemony,’ where two homogenous 
camps occupy the entire political space and sustain their identi-
ties solely ‘through their opposition to one another’ (Palonen 2009: 
331). any new cleavages or demands are instantly articulated into 
this existing system of pro- vs. anti-Erdoğanism, leaving no space 
for a third position – not in party politics, business life, neighbour-
hoods or even families. the fact that there seems to be no way out 
of this deadlock at the moment but a divorce, a complete division of 
turkish society into two distinct people(s), is a strong warning for 
not equating populism with politics per se as laclau does. far from 
being a theoretical limit concept, pure populism is an actual, albeit 
extreme, possibility, which can be realized when a logic of equiva-
lence rages unabated. therefore it is plausible to side with laclau’s 
‘sympathetic’ critics who more or less share his ontological catego-
rization of populism as a political logic of articulation without en-
dorsing its ultimate conclusion. as the Erdoğanism case demon-
strates, their warnings of an inherent risk of extreme polarization 
and personalization in populism are far from being ungrounded.
This article argued that, as the dominant discourse in contem-
porary turkish politics, Erdoğanism has reached the extreme point 
of pure populism, whereby a total consumption of one’s ego un-
der that of the leader becomes the precondition of being counted in 
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‘the people’, who never question or criticize but simply love, obey 
and follow him. although it is commonplace to observe that polar-
ization is an ‘instrumental electoral strategy’ Erdoğan employs to 
‘consolidate his constituency,’ little attention is paid in the litera-
ture to the extreme ways in which this strategy consumes the par-
ticular identities of his followers (keyman 2014). it also simulta-
neously pushes the opposition to a dark corner where adopting an 
equally polarizing anti-Erdoğanist stance emerges as the only way 
of survival, even though this amounts to being labelled ‘enemies of 
the people’ and paradoxically reproduces the Erdoğanist discourse. 
This author sincerely hopes that the present article, at the very least, 
manages to draw some attention to this significant lack in the liter-
ature on Turkish politics.
74Nykykulttuuri 122
ReFeRenCes
Akyol, Mustafa (2016a) “AKP moderate declared traitor”. Al-Monitor. 2 
Feb. web. 25 May 2016.
akyol, mustafa (2016b) “how mysterious new turkish blog exposed 
Erdoğan-davutoğlu rift”. Al-Monitor. 3 May. web. 25 May 2016.
akyol, mustafa (2016c) “as davutoğlu exits, Erdoğanists demand ‘obedi-
ence to the leader’”. Al-Monitor. 11 May. web. 27 May 2016.
akarca, mehmet (2013) “Species of pm” [Başbakan türleri]. Takvim. 26 
Aug.
Alaranta, Toni (2015) National and state identity in Turkey. london: row-
man & littlefield.
albertazzi, daniele & mcdonnell, duncan (eds) (2008) Twenty-first cen-
tury populism: the spectre of Western European democracy. new York 
and Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Arditi, Benjamin (2007) Politics on the edges of liberalism: difference, 
populism, revolution, agitation. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.
Arditi, Benjamin (2010) “Populism is Hegemony is Politics? On Ernesto 
Laclau’s On Populist Reason”. Constellations 17:3, 488-497.
Bekdil, Burak (2016) “turkish Sultan’s new grand vizier: what is his main 
goal?” Gatestone Institute. 24 May. web. 26 May 2016.
Betz, hans-Georg (2015) “the revenge of the Ploucs: the revival of radi-
cal populism under Marine Le Pen in France”. In Hanspeter Kriesi & 
Takis S. Pappas (eds), European populism in the shadow of the great re-
cession, pp. 75-90. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Bilgiç, Esra Ercan & kafkaslı, Zehra (2013) I’m a young liberal, what do I 
want? [Gencim, Özgürlükçüyüm, ne İstiyorum?]. istanbul: Bilgi uni-
versity Press. E-Book. Retrieved from: http://www.bilgiyay.com/con-
tent/files/dirEnGEZi.pdf.
Bozkurt, abdullah (2016) “political fundamentalism in turkey”. Today’s 
Zaman. 16 January. web. 28 May 2016.
75 Gürhanlı
Bulut, Yiğit (2016) “those who dream of the equation: turkey without 
Erdoğan - world without turkey” [Erdoğan’sız türkiye-türkiye’siz 
Dünya Denklemi Hayali Kuranlar]. Star. 4 April.
Canovan, Margaret (2000) The people. Cambridge: Polity.
Casier, Marlies, Jongerden, Joost & walker, Nic (2011) “Fruitless at-
tempts? The Kurdish initiative and containment of the Kurdish move-
ment in Turkey”. New Perspectives on Turkey  44, 103-127.
Celep, Ödül (2014) “Can the Kurdish left contribute to Turkey’s democra-
tization?” Insight Turkey 16:3, 165-180.
cornell Svante E. (2014) “Erdogan’s looming downfall: turkey at the 
Crossroads”. Middle East Quarterly 21:2, 13-25.
Crouch, Colin (2004) Post-democracy. London: Polity.
Çağaptay, Soner (2015) “turkey’s divisions are so deep they threaten its 
future”. The Guardian. 18 October. web. 27 May 2016.
Çandar, cengiz (2015a) “is akp heading for a split?” Al-Monitor. 18 Sep. 
2015. web. 25 May 2016.
Çandar, cengiz  (2015b) “Bombshell book exposes Gül’s differences with 
Erdoğan”. Al-Monitor. 16 June. web. 25 May 2016.
Çetin, kadir (2014) “tayyip Erdoğan is the joy of life, i’d die for him” 
[tayyip Erdoğan hayatın tadı-tuzu, Öl dese Ölürüm]. İhlas News 
Agency. 25 July. web. 27 May 2016.
Çetin, ramazan (2008) “Book crisis in denizli” [denizli’de kitap krizi]. 
Hürriyet. 28 March. web. 26 May 2016.
De Bellaigue, Christopher (2015) “The Sultan of Turkey”. The New York 
Review of Books 62:20. web. 24 May 2016.
demirtaş, Serkan (2016) “turkish politics ahead of hot and tense sum-
mer”. Hürriyet Daily News. 28 May. web. 30 May 2016.
Elcivan, temel (2016) “arguments of presidency: kılıçdaroğlu, he can-
not reach his goal before annihilating us” [Başkanlık tartışmaları: 
kılıçdaroğlu, Bizi yok etmeden amacına ulaşamayacak]. Doğan News 
Agency. 29 May. web. 30 May 2016.
76Nykykulttuuri 122
Erdoğan, Emre (2016) “turkey: divided we stand”. German marshall 
Fund. On Turkey. No. 118.
Eseyan, markar (2016) “people and Erdoğan cannot be set against one an-
other” [millet ile Erdoğan arasında “fitne” Çıkmaz]. Akşam. 7 May.
Finc, Dani (2010) The political right in Israel: different faces of jewish 
populism. London: Routledge.
fraser, Suzan (2016) “turkey’s Erdoğan asks longtime ally to form new 
government”. Associated Press. 22 May. web. 30 May 2016.
Freud, Sigmund (2001) “Group psychology and the analysis of ego 
(1921)”. The standard edition of the psychological works of Sigmund 
Freud. Vol. 18. London: Vintage.
Gardner, david (2016) “recep tayyip Erdoğan seeks limitless power”. 
The Financial Times. 11 May. web. 25 May 2016.
Glynos, Jason & howarth, david (2007) Logics of critical explanation in 
social and political theory. abingdon & new York: routledge.
Gezen, Burak & Ersan küçükkuru, Ersan (2013) “unusual praises to pm” 
[Başbakan’a Sıradışı Övgüler]. Hürriyet. web. 27 May 2016.
Gürhanlı, halil (2015) “playing the system: laclau, oakeshott and skepti-
cal populism”. Telos  173, pp. 163-179.
Gürsel, kadri (2013) “will Erdoğan choose to fight?” Al-Monitor. 7 June. 
web. 25 May 2016.
Gürsel, kadri (2016) “does Erdoğan believe he’s on a mission from God?” 
Al-Monitor. 9 March. web. 27 May 2016.
hakan, ahmet (2013) “our holy cities” [mübarek Şehirlerimiz]. Hürriyet. 
11 February. web. 27 May 2016.
HDN [hürriyet daily news] (2015) “Journalists, armenians, gays are ‘rep-
resentatives of sedition,’ Erdoğan says”. 3 June. web. 24 may 2016.
howarth, david (2000) Discourse. Buckingham: Open University Press.
howarth, david (2004) “hegemony, political subjectivity, and radical de-
mocracy”. In Simon Critchley & Oliver Marchart Laclau (eds), A criti-
cal reader, pp. 256-276. abingdon & new York: routledge.
77 Gürhanlı
howarth, david, norval, aletta J. & Stavrakakis, Yannis (2000) Dis-
course theory and political analysis. Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press.
İdiz, Semih (2013) “Erdoğan blames international conspiracy for pro-
tests”. Al-Monitor. 14 June. web. 24 May 2016.
karadaş, düzgün (2012) “could the prophet have id paper?” [peygam-
berin nüfus cüzdanı olur mu?]. Habertürk. 18 October. web. 26 May 
2016.
Katsambekis, Giorgos (2014) “Populism against democracy or Europe 
against itself?” In Populism, political ecology and the Balkans, pp. 43-
55. Athens: Green Institute Greece.
katsambekis, Giorgos & Stavrakakis, Yannis (2014) “left-wing populism 
in the European periphery: the case of SYriZa”.  Journal of Politi-
cal Ideologies 19:2, 119-142. print. doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2014.9
09266
keneş, Bülent (2013) “what’s recep tayyip Erdoğan to us?” [recep 
tayyip Erdoğan neyimiz olur?]. T24 Haber. 22 December. web. 27 
May 2016.
keyman, E. fuat (2014) “the ak party: dominant party, new turkey and 
polarization”. Insight Turkey 16:2, 19-31.
kılınç, durmuş ali (2010) “Scandal man spoke for the first time” [olay 
adam İlk kez konuştu]. Habertürk. 5 February. web. 26 May 2016.
Kioupkiolis, Alexandros & Katsambekis, Giorges (eds) (2014) Radical de-
mocracy and collective movements today: the biopolitics of the multi-
tude versus the hegemony of the people. Farnham: Ashgate.
küçükşahin, Şükrü (2016) “Erdoğan’s akp critics grow bolder”. Al-Moni-
tor. 16 February. web. 25 May 2016.
Laclau, Ernesto (1990) New reflections on the revolution of our time. Lon-
don: Verso.
Laclau, Ernesto (2007) On populist reason. 2nd ed. London: Verso.
78Nykykulttuuri 122
laclau, Ernesto (2005) “populism: what’s in a name?” in francisco paniz-
za (ed.) Populism and the mirror of democracy, pp. 32-49. London: 
Verso.
Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal (2001) Hegemony and socialist strat-
egy. 2nd ed. London: Verso.
loyd, anthony (2016) “revenge will be ours, pledges turkey’s most 
wanted man”. The Times. 15 March. web. 24 May 2016.
Marchart, Oliver (2007) Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political 
Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press.
mert, nuray (2016) “Erdoğan’s turkey”. Hürriyet Daily News. 9 May. 
web. 27 May 2016.
metiner, mehmet (2016) “mentality change via the congress of fideli-
ty” [vefa kongresiyle Zihniyet değişimi]. Star. 24 May. web. 26 May 
2016.
Mouffe, Chantal (1993) The return of the political. London: Verso.
Mouffe, Chantal (2013) Agonistics. London: Verso.
nasi, Selin (2016) “dimensions of polarization in turkey”. Hürriyet Daily 
News. 2 February. web. 27 May 2016.
o’Grady, Siobhán (2016) “turkey has opened at least 1,845 cases over in-
sults to Erdoğan”. Foreign Policy. 2 Marcy. web. 27 May 2016.
Ongun, Selin (2016) “Trolling orders come from the palace Ahmet Sever 
Says” [ahmet Sever: trol’lerin talimatları Saray’dan Geliyor]. Cum-
huriyet. 8 May. web. 24 May 2016.
Önal, hasan (2014) “Erdoğan the leader of ummah” [Erdoğan Ümmetin 
Lideri]. Yeni Akit. 12 August. web. 26 May 2016.
Özgüven, İlyas (2016) “harsh words from kılıçdaroğlu to akp” 
[kılıçdaroğlu’ndan ak parti’ye Çok ağır Sözler]. Doğan News Agen-
cy. 13 March. web. 24 May 2016.
Özkırımlı, umut (ed.) (2014) The making of a protest movement in Turkey: 
#occupygezi. london & new York: palgrave macmillan.
79 Gürhanlı
Palonen, Emilia (2009) “Political polarisation and populism in contempo-
rary Hungary”. Parliamentary Affairs 62:2:, 318-334. doi.org/10.1093/
pa/gsn048
polat, Yılmaz (2016) “lighted-up trucks were rented for Erdoğan’s arrival 
to washington d.c.” [washington sokaklarında Erdoğan için ışıklı rek-
lam kamyoneti kiralandı]. ABC Gazetesi. 1 April. web. 27 May 2016.
Rancière, Jacques (2006) The hatred of democracy. London: Verso.
ramoğlu, Ersin (2016) “lawrences’ target is Erdoğan” [lawrence’lerin 
hedefi Erdoğan]. Sabah. 3 February.
Stanley, Ben (2008) “The thin ideology of populism”. Journal of Political 
Ideologies 13:1, 95-110. print. doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289
Stavrakakis, Yannis (2014) “the return of ‘the people’: populism and anti-
populism in the shadow of the European crisis”. Constellations 21:4, 
505-517. print. doi:10.1111/1467-8675.12127
Süsoy, Yener (2004) “my goal is to reach 1 million bed places” [hedefim 
1 milyon Yatak]. Hürriyet. 26 April. web. 30 May 2016.
Swyngedouw, Erik (2010) “apocalypse forever: post-political populism 
and the spectre of climate change”. Theory, Culture & Society 27:2-3, 
213–232. print. doi.org/10.1177/0263276409358728
taşkın, kenan (2011) “mayor enters the parliament” [of Belediye Başkanı 
Saral da TBMM’ye girdi]. Habertürk. 13 June. web. 27 May 2016.
tremblay, pınar (2015) “media mogul declares his ‘masculine love’ to 
Erdoğan”. Al-Monitor. 22 May. web. 27 May 2016.
tremblay, pınar  (2016) “turkey’s culture of snitching”. Al-Monitor. 29 
February. web. 27 May 2016.
Urbinati, Nadia (2013) “The populist phenomenon”. Raisons Politiques 
51:3, 137-154.
Üzer, hakan (2011) “akp’s Şahin: Even touching the pm is worship to 
me” [ak partili Şahin: Başbakan’a dokunmak bile bence ibadettir]. 
Milliyet. 20 July. web. 26 May 2016.
velidedeoğlu, meriç (2015) “from shadow of allah to messenger of al-
lah?” [allah’ın Gölgesinden allah’ın Elçisine mi?]. Cumhuriyet. 20 
March.
Yackley, ayla Jean (2015) “turkey’s Erdoğan says high interest rate ‘lob-
by’ guilty of treason”. Reuters. 28 February. web. 25 May 2016.
Yavuz, m. hakan & Özcan, nihat ali  (2015) “turkish democracy and the 
Kurdish question”. Middle East Policy 22:4, 73-87. print. doi: 10.1111/
mepo.12159
Yeginsu, ceylan (2016) “party in turkey elects Binali Yildirim, Erdoğan 
Ally, as Prime Minister”. New York Times. 22 May. web. 27 May 
2016.
Yılmaz, mehtap (2015) “what more you could achieve abdullah Gül? 
project Selahattin’s pray granted; allah damned you!” [daha ne olasın 
abdullah Gül? duan kabul oldu proje Selahattin; allah Belanızı ver-
di!]. Yeni Akit. 1 October.
Yılmaz, mehtap (2016) “corroded in fEtÖ: hüseyin Çelik” [hüseyin 
Çelik Fetö’de Oksitlenince]. Yeni Akit. 17 May.
Žižek, Slavoj (2008) The sublime object of ideology. 2nd ed. London: 
Verso.
